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This paper analyses current government expenditure in Fiji using annual time series data for 
the period 1969-1999. Alternative theories of government expenditure are reviewed and a 
distinction is made between economic/apolitical determinants and institutional/political 
determinants. Categorising the literature in this way suggests the application of non-nested 
tests in empirical work. The first step is to estimate the two models separately. All four test 
statistics for non-nested hypotheses lead to the conclusion of double rejection. A 
parsimonious comprehensive model, encompassing both economic and institutional variables, 
is preferred as it passes all diagnostic tests and involves the acceptance conclusion from 
pairwise non-nested tests. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Fiji became independent in 1970 with Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as Prime Minister after nearly 
a century as a British colony. Fiji had a population of 801000 in 1999 and has been classified 
as a lower middle income country by the World Bank, with a per capita annual income of 
US$2310 [World Bank, 2001]. Although it is one of the most developed of the Pacific island 
economies, it still has a large subsistence sector and the economy can be regarded as dualistic. 
Sugar and clothing are the main (commodities) export industries. Political uncertainties have 
created economic uncertainties. Coups in 1987 and more recently in May 2000 have created 
an economic environment which is not conducive to long-term investment as a result of 
poorly-defined property rights and migration of skilled workers [Gani, 1998]. For an account 
of recent economic events see Chand (1998) and for political and constitutional events see 
Lal and Lamour [1997]. 
 
Given this turbulent recent history concerning governance it is relevant to apply contemporary 
public finance theories on the determinants of the size of the government sector. The 
objective of this paper is to do just that. 
 
Since the pioneering studies by Borcherding and Deacon [1972] and Bergstrom and Goodman 
[1973] the analysis of the size of the government sector has ceased to be characterised by the 
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atheoretical or ad hoc analyses that were dominant until then.  For bibliographies of the early 
literature see Pryor [1968, pp. 46-51] and Borcherding [1977, pp. 67-70].  Essentially the 
modern analysis of the demand for goods and services provided by government involves an 
application of the median voter hypothesis, associated with Downs [1957]. 
 
In essence the demand for public goods is conceived of as the outcome of the demand for 
public goods by the median voter, or as Borcherding [1985] puts it, by “the Fiscal Everyman”.  
Put otherwise, the demand for government expenditure is to be seen as a function of the 
characteristics of the median voter.  This conceptual framework leads to a relatively 
parsimonious specification of the explanatory variables in the demand equation.  Those 
factors are as follows:  prices, income and population, as well as some other relevant 
variables.  For an exposition see, inter alia, Larkey, Stolp and Winer [1981], Mueller [1989] 
and Brown and Jackson [1986]. 
 
This conceptual framework is, by no means, the only theory of government expenditure.  For 
instance, Wagner [1883] had argued that the public sector expands as the structure of the 
economy changes and as income rises through time; Peacock and Wiseman [1967] have 
argued that government expenditure is subject to a “displacement effect” associated with 
some crisis such as war; and Nordhaus [1975] has argued that government expenditure (and 
other macroeconomic variables) are subject to “political business cycles”.  It is not our 
purpose here to enumerate these numerous theories and/or create a new classification scheme.  
See for example Lybeck [1988] for a 12-fold classification of such theories, Henrekson 
[1988] for a categorisation of demand and supply side determinants and Mueller [1989, pp. 
320-47] for a five-fold classification scheme. 
 
The approach adopted in this paper is to categorise explanatory variables of government 
expenditure as being of an economic/apolitical kind or of an institutional/political nature.  
This dual scheme has been employed by Borcherding [1985] and Halsey and Borcherding 
[1997].  Such a formulation suggests a means by which an indication of the relative 
importance of these two models can be established.  Viewing explanatory variables in this 
way invites the application of non-nested econometric tests. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows:  the next section presents a theoretical framework for 
the analysis.  Then a brief account of the structure of the government sector in Fiji and some 
relevant time series data on the phenomena to be explained are provided.  The penultimate 
section provides the econometric results of multiple regression equations and the non-nested 
tests applied to discriminate between the models.  The final section presents a summary. 
 
II.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
 
It is useful to employ Borcherding’s [1985] and Halsey and Borcherding’s [1997] 
categorisation of the explanatory variables as “economic/apolitical” variables and 
“institutional/political” variables.  This dual categorisation is preferable to t he multi-
categorisation employed by, inter alia, Neck and Schneider [1988].  They employ a five-fold 
classification,  viz. economic determinants; interest groups and bureaucracy; elections, 
ideologies and centralisation of power; stabilisation; and fiscal illusion.  Mueller [1989] also 
employs a (different) five-fold classification scheme. 
Another dimension to this two-fold classification is that it is relevant to the following 
question: “What is the relative importance of economic/apolitical and institutional/political   3 
variables in determining government expenditure?”  Borcherding [1977] had this question in 
mind and he provided an answer by calculating a growth equation of government expenditure 
through time using estimated coefficients of relevant explanatory variables.  This procedure 
was repeated by Borcherding [1985] in which he concluded that a -institutional variables 
explain “almost 40 per cent of the growth rate of the US public budgets over the nearly eight 
decades following 1902.  Put another way, these three changes [price, income and population] 
explain why government absorbed 18 per cent of GNP in 1978, not the actual share, 35 per 
cent” [Borcherding, 1985, p. 368].  Needless to say, for Borcherding “institutions do matter”, 
but he is unable to determine the relevant importance of the institutional variables as “the 
range of parameter and variable estimates is too wide or imprecise” [Borcherding, 1985, p. 
370). 
 
Another way to shed some light on this issue of the significance of economic/apolitical and 
institutional/political determinants of government expenditure is to apply tests of non-nested 
or separate hypotheses.  To apply such tests requires the specification of several models to 
explain the same dependent variable. 
 
III.   THE ECONOMIC/APOLITICAL MODEL 
 



















Łł                 (1) 
where  Gt is real government consumption expenditure, 
  A is a constant, 
  Pgt is the price of government-provided goods and services, as measured by the 
government price deflator, 
  Pyt is the price of private goods and services as measured by the GDP price deflator, 
  Yt is real GDP, 
  POPt is population, and 
  b1, b2, b3, b4 are elasticities to be estimated. 
 
This equation b ears a close resemblance to the formulations in Borcherding and Deacon 
[1972] and Bergstrom and Goodman [1973].  For details see Gemmell [1990].  In the 
literature applying the median voter conception, it is noteworthy that prices have been proxied 
by a number of different measures.  In this study, following Henrekson [1988] and Gemmell 
[1990], prices are measured by relevant price deflators. 
 
However, there may be a problem associated with Equation (1).  This relates to (possible) 
multicollinearity between Pg and Py.  One solution to this problem is to use a ratio of relative 
prices by forming the ratio Pg/Py.  The expected sign of this coefficient is negative, however 
the procedure involves a restriction on the two coefficients to be equal in (absolute) 
magnitude. 
 
Rising government expenditure can occur as a result of rising prices for the inputs 
(particularly labour) employed by government.  In this context it is relevant to consider 
“Baumol’s disease” [Baumol, 1967].  Baumol’s conception is of an economy with two   4 
sectors, one being “progressive” in the sense that productivity advances characterise 
production, and the other sector being “non-progressive” in that there are few economies of 
scale or advances in technology applicable to this sector’s production.  Baumol suggests that 
the production of services, in general, falls into the latter sector.  Often quoted examples are 
the services of hairdressers, the performing arts etc.  It is also often argued that much of the 
government sector falls into this “non-progressive” category.  The point is that the price of 
labour in the former sector rises as a result of the productivity advances, and the price of 
labour will have to rise in the latter sector to attract labour.  This process brings about a rise in 
the relative price of the services of the “non-progressive” sector. 
 
Generally, the existing empirical literature indicates that the price elasticity of demand is of 
the order of –0.5.  In other words, demand for public goods/services has been found to be 
inelastic.  For discussions of the empirical literature see Borcherding [1985] and Brown and 
Jackson [1986].  Gemmell’s [1990] results confirm this order of magnitude in general but 
indicate that demand is elastic for some developing countries. 
 
The expected sign on the income variable (Y/POP) is positive.  In the usual interpretation of 
Wagner’s law [Wagner, 1983], it is expected that the magnitude of the income elasticity will 
be greater than unity.  See Gemmell [1993].  There are various empirical estimates of the 
income elasticity of demand, and Borcherding [1985] takes 0.75 as the appropriate order of 
magnitude.  Gemmell [1990] obtains a coefficient for his full sample of 0.98 with some 
elasticities for developed countries exceeding unity.  However, those  elasticities are not 
significantly greater than unity.  Thus there is little support for Wagner’s law, which implies 
that the income coefficient is greater than unity. 
 
As to the coefficient on the population variable, b3, it can be argued that this coefficient 
measures the degree of “publicness” of goods and services produced by the government 
sector.  This interpretation is to be found in both Borcherding and Deacon [1972] and 
Bergstrom and Goodman [1973].  If in fact b3 is equal to zero, it can be concluded that the 
goods and services produced by government are “pure” (Samuelsonian) public goods.  If  b3 
is equal to unity, then it suggests that when population grows, the demand for the goods and 
services provided by government increases proportionally.  Under such circumstances, the 
public goods and services are perfectly substitutable by privately produced goods and 
services.  Put otherwise, the goods and services produced by government are pure private 
goods.  Values for this coefficient between zero and unity are interpreted to be “mixed” 
goods.  However, Mueller [1989, pp. 193-4) points to some complications in the 
interpretation of this parameter.  See also Gonzalez, Means and Mehay [1993]. 
 
The general consensus in the empirical literature is that the degree of publicness coefficient is 
approximately unity, thus indicating that the goods and services provided by government are 
private in nature, although Deacon [1978] reports that this coefficient is 0.75 for local 
government.  Gemmell’s [1990] results indicate that in all cases (sub-samples of developing 
countries and developed countries, and all countries) b3 (in our notation) is always greater 
than zero (thus rejecting the hypothesis that government provides pure public goods). 
 
Another important problem relates to the specification of Equation (1).  There may be 
structural changes occurring in the economy through time which lead to increased demands of 
existing government services or demands for new government services.  To take account of   5 
this “structural” issue, Equation (2), a modification of Equation (1), written in log form, is as 
follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0123  ()   / /  tgtptttt  lnG lnPP lnYPOP lnAGEMR bbbb =+++       (2) 
where  AGEMR is the ratio of agricultural employment to total employment. 
 
The ratio of agricultural employment to total employment  is included as an additional 
explanatory variable to take account of temporal changes in the structure of the economy.  As 
the economy grows and the agriculture sector becomes less important, there is an increased 
demand for existing services, and/or a demand for new services provided by government.  A 
number of studies have employed similar structural variables such as population density and 
females as a percentage of the total workforce.  See, for example Borcherding [1985].  In this 
study this structural variable is measured by the single variable AGEMR, as defined above.  
To include more than one such measure in a regression equation is to invite multicollinearity 
of a severe kind. It should be noted that this type of variable also appears in the much-
discussed Wagner [1883] argument about the growth of the public sector through time.  For a 
detailed discussion of Wagner’s arguments see Bird [1971] and Gemmell [1993].  However, 
the rationalisation of this structural variable in this study is not derivative from Wagner’s 
writing but rather from the more modern conceptions such as externalities.  Similarly Wagner 
emphasised the role of increasing income through time as a determinant on the size of 
government sector, and income is an explanatory variable in this study. However the rationale 
for income here does not emanate from Wagner’s pot-pourri of descriptive and normative 
economics.  The income variable finds its justification in the theoretical developments 
associated with Borcherding and Deacon [1972] and Bergstrom and Goodman [1973]. 
 
IV.  THE INSTITUTIONAL/POLITICAL MODEL 
 
An important advance in the study of the public sector occurred in the 1950s, when some 
economists applied the tools of their trade to non-market decision making, i.e. economic 
theory was applied to issues which had previously been in the domain of political science.  
This development, initiated by, inter alia, Black [1948], Downs [1957], and Buchanan and 
Tullock [1962], is now generally referred to as “public choice”.  See Mueller [1989] and 
Mueller [1997] for comprehensive accounts of this approach. 
 
An important conclusion from the public choice school is that the outcomes of the public 
sector are determined, in part, by institutions, their procedures and the people working in 
those institutions.  In other words, fiscal institutions can determine outcomes.  This seemingly 
trite point, i.e. that institutions matter, is central to the public choice literature.  As Buchanan 
and Wagner [1977, p.636] put it “We are institutionalists in the sense that we think that 
arrangements or rules do affect outcomes.” 
 
An obvious starting point is to recognise that temporal government expenditures may be 
affected by elections. An incumbent government may increase expenditure to “buy” votes and 
decrease  the probability of re-election.  This argument is a part of the literature on “the 
political business cycle” which also analyses other macroeconomic dimensions such as 
unemployment, inflation, etc.  See Nordhaus [1975] and, for more recent developments, 
Alesina [1989] and Rogoff [1990].  Paldam [1997] provides a comprehensive review.  This   6 
factor will be measured by an intercept dummy variable (EDV) which takes the value of unity 
for an election year and zero otherwise. 
 
Another obvious factor to consider is the ideological affiliations of competing political parties 
and/or factions.  In many studies of western societies this variable is often measured on a left-
right political spectrum.  In the context of Fiji this left-right conception is not meaningful.  
Furthermore there are no relevant data whereby an ideological disposition can be measured.  
Typically governments are not indifferent to macroeconomic variables such as unemployment 
and inflation.  Government expenditure, the variable to be explained in this study, is often 
used as a macroeconomic instrument.  Whether such factors (unemployment and inflation) 
are at work in Fiji is an empirical matter to be determined. 
 
Another dimension of human activity that can affect government is the formation and power 
of interest or pressure groups. This factor has been given some prominence by Olson [1982] 
in the context of economic growth, but public choice writers have been concerned with this 
issue since Tullock’s [1959] analysis of majority rule.  See also Stigler [1970] and his 
argument, “Director’s Law”, that redistribution of income, mainly via the provision of private 
goods rather than the supply of public goods, is directed to particular groups. Mueller and 
Murrell’s [1986] empirical analysis of the symbiotic relationship between government and 
interest groups indicates a positive relationship, ceteris paribus, between government size and 
the number of interest groups.  Similarly Lybeck [1986] has found that the size of government 
in Sweden is positively related to the proportion of employees who were members of interest 
groups. 
 
Two measures that have been employed in a number of studies are the extent of unionisation 
of the workforce and public employment as a percentage of total employment [Hackl, 
Schneider and Withers, 1993].  Another measure is the extent of unionisation in the public 
sector [Marlow and Orzechowski, 1996].  Data on such variables are not available for Fiji, 
however given that government employees are categorised in being in the service sector, we 
proxy this by the ratio of service employment to total employment (SEREMR). 
 
An offsetting factor which can counteract the influence of interest groups on the size of 
government is the extent to which the economy is subject to general competitive forces via 
international trade.  This factor can be measured by an index of openness to trade (OPEN), 
which can be defined as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP.  Whether such a 
factor is significant or not is an empirical matter to be determined. 
 
Another important dimension of the public choice literature relates to fiscal illusion, an issue 
that was emphasised by Buchanan [1960, 1967] but first argued by Amilare Puviani.  Writing 
in a positivistic style not dissimilar from Machiavelli’s The Prince, Puviani sees the state as 
“monopolistic”, in that it is an “agency through which one group of persons, those possessed 
with power, exerts its will upon persons in another group, those who are dominated” 
[Buchanan, 1967, p. 129].  Given this conception, fiscal structures will be designed in such a 
way that the ruling class can extract resources from the ruled class so as to provide the goods 
and services that the ruling class wants produced. To achieve this objective, government will 
create “fiscal illusions, and these will have the effect of making taxpayers think that the taxes 
to which they are subjected are less burdensome that they actually are” [Buchanan 1967, p 
131].  The effect of fiscal illusion is to have a public sector larger than the citizens want.   7 
Brennan and Buchanan’s [1977, 1980] arguments about fiscal leviathans are also relevant in 
this context. See Oates [1988] for a survey of five manifestations of fiscal illusion. 
 
The empirical results are mixed. Niskanen [1978] finds some support for the Buchanan and 
Wagner [1977] argument concerning debt finance; Wagner [1976] shows that tax complexity 
is positively associated with the size of government; and Oates [1975] has shown that state 
governments with more income-elastic tax structures increased expenditure more than did 
those with less elastic tax systems.  
 
In this study we employ several variables to test for fiscal illusion in Fiji.  First, we have 
calculated Hirschman-Herfindahl indices (HHI) [Hirschman, 1964] of complexity of the tax 
system (HHIT) for Fiji.  See Martin [1994] for an explanation of the HHI.  Second we have 
calculated a ratio of direct taxes to total taxes (DTAXR). 
 
Another institutional factor we consider is inertia or incrementalism, measured by the lagged 
value of the dependent variable (Gt–1).  This argument about government size is associated 
with Wildavsky [1964, p. 13] who argues that “the largest determining factor of the size and 
content of this year’s budget is last year’s budget.” 
 
As mentioned previously Fiji’s recent history has involved several coups (two in 1987 and 
more recently in 2000). The 2000 coup is beyond our sample period and therefore does not 
appear in this analysis. To test for the impact of the 1987 coups, an intercept dummy variable 
is inserted in the regression equations to take account of this phenomenon by assigning 1 for 
1987 and 1988, and zero otherwise. The effect of this political instability on real GDP and 
government expenditure can be discerned in Figure 1, which provides a plot of both real GDP 
and real government current expenditure for the period 1969-1999.  
 
It should be noted that, although our explanatory variables seem comprehensive, they are 
somewhat restricted in both interest groups and bureaucratic influences.  This restriction 
arises from the lack of appropriate data. 
 
The institutional/political model can be stated as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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where  EDV is an intercept dummy variable which equals unity when there has been an 
election, and zero otherwise, 
  U is the unemployment rate, 
  SEREMR is the ratio of service employment to total employment, 
  OPEN is an index of openness as defined by total exports and imports divided  
by GDP, 
  HHIT is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of tax complexity, 
  DTAXR is the ratio of direct taxes to total taxes, 
  D  ln(Py) is the inflation rate using the GDP price deflator,  
  Gt–1 is lagged government expenditure as a proxy for bureaucratic inertia or 
incrementalism, and   8 
DUM(Coup) is an intercept dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for 1987 and 
1988, and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 1 summarises this discussion by indicating the potential explanatory variables in both 
the economic/apolitical model and the institutional/political model.  This Table also indicates 
the expected signs of the coefficients when estimated. The econometric procedure adopted 
here is not only to examine the goodness-of-fit statistics but also the t-statistics of individual 
coefficients. In addition to the above, other dimensions of the general to specific methodology 
have been adopted. In particular, omitting insignificant variables by applying several 
maximum likelihood tests by imposing joint restrictions on explanatory variables in the 
economic/apolitical and/or the institutional/political models to obtain the most parsimonious 
and robust equations in the estimation process. Also we have undertaken exhaustive 
diagnostic tests.   
 
TABLE 1 
ECONOMIC/STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
APPLIED IN THE REAL DEMAND FOR GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN FIJI 
Variable name  Variable definition  Expected 
sign 
Economic/Apolitical     
Pg  Government price deflator  – 
Py  GDP price deflator  + 
Pg/Py  Relative price ratio  – 
Y/POP  Real per capita GDP  + 
POP  Population  zero or + 
AGEMR  Ratio of agricultural employment to total employment  – 
Institutional/Political     
Gt-1  Lagged real government expenditure (bureaucratic 
inertia or incrementalism) 
 
+ 
SEREMR  Ratio of service employment to total employment  + 
OPEN  Index of openness defined as total exports plus 
imports, divided by GDP 
 
- 
D ln(Pyt)  Inflation rate using GDP price deflator  + 
U  Unemployment rate  + 
HHIT  Hirschman-Herfindahl index of tax complexity  – 
DTAXR  Ratio of direct taxes to total taxes  – 
EDV  Election dummy variable  + 
DUM(Coup)  Coup dummy variable (1987 and 1988)  - 
 
 
V.   ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
 
Equations (2) and (3) are non-nested hypotheses to explain the size of government in Fiji.  
Non-nested models require “that each of the two regression functions contain at least one 
regressor that is not in the other” [Davidson and MacKinnon 1993, p. 381].  It should be 
noted that the economic literature is littered with non-nested hypotheses.  For example, the 
macroeconomic literature on consumption is an obvious example.  Pesaran and D eaton 
[1978] and Fisher and McAleer [1981] have applied non-nested tests to these separate 
theories. Other issues analysed include the policy “ineffectiveness” proposition. See Pesaran 
[1982], Rush and Waldo [1988], Pesaran [1988], and McAleer and McKenzie [1991].   9 
 
Another area of economics in which non-nested tests have been applied is consumer demand 
theory.  Deaton [1978] has analysed an early version of the AIDS model and the linear 
expenditure system.  Deaton’s application of the non-nested tests indicates that both models 
fail.  “Double rejection” is an important characteristic of non-nested tests: one or both of the 
models may be characterised as false.  For Deaton double rejection does not lead to despair:  
“it is perfectly possible, that in a particular case, economists are not possessed of the true 
model” [Deaton, 1978, p.535).  Other outcomes of non-nested tests are that both models can 
be accepted and that one model can be accepted and the other rejected. 
 
The point is that non-nested tests can produce four possible outcomes since each or both 
models  may or may not be rejected.  As such they are specification tests which “may well tell 
us that neither model seems to be compatible with the data” [Davidson and MacKinnon, 
1993, p.384].  If acceptance of one model and rejection of the other is the outcome of the test, 
it will provide an indication of the relative importance of the two models of government 
expenditure.  This is the alternative way of shedding some light on the Borcherding [1985] 
question as to the importance of institutional determinants of government expenditure.  
However, if double rejection is the outcome, then an obvious step to take is the estimation of 
an equation with both categories of explanatory variables. 
 
To the best of our knowledge there is only one application [Turnbull and Djoundourian, 
1994] of non-nested tests in this general area of public expenditure analysis. 
 
VI.   SOME RELEVANT TIME SERIES DATA ON GOVERNMENT IN FIJI 
 
As mentioned previously Fiji is categorised as a lower middle income country by the World 
Bank.  Unlike federations such as the US, Canada, Australia and Germany, Fiji has a 
government structure which consists of only a central government and a (relatively small) 
local government sector.  In this respect  it is similar to the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand. 
 
Figure 1 presents time series data on real GDP and real government current expenditure (in 
1989 constant prices) for the period analysed in this study, 1969-1999.  It is clear that GDP 
has experienced some fluctuations through time.  Note the decrease in GDP and government 
expenditure in 1987 and 1988. For further details on the structure of the Fiji economy see 
inter alia, Kasper, Bennett and Blandy [1988] and Treadgold [1992].  Table 2 presents 
descriptions of the data employed and summary statistics. 
   10 
FIGURE 1 
GDP AND REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE (G), 
















Source: World Bank (2001). 
Note:  The left-hand scale indicates GDP (F$ million) and the right-hand scale  measures 
government current expenditure (F$ million), both in constant 1989 prices. 
 
TABLE 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA EMPLOYED, FIJI, 
1969-1999 
Variables  Unit  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
G   Fijian $ (1989 
prices) 
272000000  91083667  106000000  431000000 
Pg/Py  Ratio  1.03  0.08  0.83  1.17 
(Y/POP)  Fijian $ (1989 
prices) 
2457  276  1747  2900 
POP  Person  669627  91121  508000  801000 
AGEMR  Ratio  3.5  1.5  1.77  7.4 
U  Unemployment 
rate (%) 
3.9  3.3  0.1  9.4 
SEREMR  Ratio  64.0  5.0  52.2  72.0 
OPEN  Ratio  1.04  0.15  0.80  1.30 
HHIT
a  1>HHIT>0  0.38  0.03  0.33  0.42 
DTAXR
a  Ratio  0.50  0.06  0.37  0.58 
D ln(Pyt)  inflation rate (%)  7.1  6.1  0  25.9 
Sources: World Bank (2001), Asian Development Bank (1995), International Monetary Fund (various) and 
International Labour Office (various). 
Note: 
a HHIT and DTAXR variables are calculable only for the period 1974-1996 due to the lack of data. 
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VII.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The first step in the econometric analysis is to enter P g and P y a s separate explanatory 
variables in the economic/apolitical model.  However, the estimated equation is subject to 
severe multicollinearity.  To address this problem the relative price ratio was substituted, and 
Equation (2) was estimated. The results are o btained using PcGive 9.21 [Hendry and 
Doornik, 1999]. 
 
Column (A) of Table 3 presents the results of estimating the economic/apolitical model (M1).  
As seen, all the estimated coefficients are significant at least at the 10 per cent level and have 
the expected theoretical signs (Given the multiplicative form of our equation, all coefficients 
are elasticities).  This equation performs very well in terms of goodness-of-fit (adjusted R
2 = 
0.935) and passes the overall F test at the one per cent level.  
 
In addition, this equation passes a battery of diagnostic tests with the only exception being the 
Durbin Watson (DW) test and the serial correlation test of order 1 and 2. Given that annual 
data are used in this study, we have re-estimated this equation (see column (B) of Table 3) by 
applying the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for first order autocorrelation. 
This is indicated by the AR(1) term in column (B) of Table 3. Since the AR(1) term is highly 
significant the equation in column (B) is preferred to the equation in column (A). Note also 
that the stochastic residuals are stationary which suggests that the estimated coefficients are 
consistent. 
 
There are a number of important points that can be drawn from the estimated coefficients of 
the economic/apolitical model.  First, the relative price coefficient (–0.67) indicates that the 
demand for government goods and services in Fiji is inelastic.  This coefficient is in the 
relevant range reported in the prior literature.  Second, the coefficient on per capita income 
(+0.55) indicates that the demand for public goods and services is normal:  given that this 
coefficient is less than unity, there is no evidence that Wagner’s law applies in the context of 
Fiji. 
   12 
TABLE 3 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE ECONOMIC/APOLITICAL MODEL (M1) AND THE 
































































AR(1)  - 
0.63 
(3.8)
*  -  - 




























Goodness-of-fit statistics     
Adjusted R
2  0.935  0.949  0.859  0.965 
F- Statistic  F(4,26) = 109
*  F(5,25) = 110
*  F(4,25) = 45
*  F(6,23) = 133
* 
Diagnostic tests     
DW  0.906
*  1.63  1.60  2.34 
AR
a 1- 2  F( 2, 24) = 5.6
*  F( 2, 23) =4.02*  F( 2, 23) = 0.5  F( 2, 21) =0.7 
ARCH
b 1  F( 1, 24) = 1.2  F( 1, 23) =  0.01  F( 1, 23) = 0.1  F( 1, 21) =0.9 
Normality
c Chi





F( 8, 17) =1.0 
F(14, 11) =0.7 
 
F( 8, 16) = 0.6 
F(14, 10) = 0.5 
 
F( 7, 17) = 0.9 
F(12, 12) = 0.6 
 
F(11, 11) =0.8 
Not calculable 
RESET
d  F( 1, 25) =1.5  F( 2, 24) =1.5  F( 1, 24) =13
*  F(1, 22) =0.00 
Order of integration of 
stochastic residuals
e 
I(0)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0) 
Notes: Data in parentheses are t statistics.  
* and  
** indicate that the relevant null hypotheses are rejected at 5 and 
10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
a) Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation up to orders 1 and 2; b) Autocorrelation conditional 
heteroskadasticity test using one lag; c) Normality test of residuals based on the skewness and kurtosis of the 
residuals; d) Ramsey’s RESET test using the square of the fitted values; and e) Based on the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test (Akaike information criterion is used to determine the optimal lag length in the corresponding 
ADF regression).   13 
 
Third, the estimated coefficient for population (+1.48) is greater than unity.  Thus there is 
absolutely no indication that the goods and services provided by government are pure 
(Samuelsonian) public goods.  However, this coefficient is greater than unity, the value which 
is taken to be the measure of pure private goods.  Put otherwise, the degree of publicness of 
government goods and services is measured by this population coefficient.  As indicated 
previously there is some controversy in the literature concerning the interpretation of this 
coefficient.  See Mueller [1989, p.193-4) and Gonzalez, Means and Mehay [1993].  It should 
also be noted that values for this parameter in the empirical literature often exceed unity, even 
in the pioneering studies of Borcherding and Deacon [1972] and Bergstrom and Goodman 
[1973].  More recently Gemmell [1990] found that for 86 of 117 countries this coefficient 
exceeded unity.  Gemmell considered three possible explanations for this result, one of which 
relates t o the fact that total population is a poor proxy for the consumers of goods and 
services provided by the government, particularly for a country such as Fiji which has a large 
proportion of its population of educational age.  This demographic factor may explain why a 
one per cent increase in total population necessitates a 1.48 per cent increase in real 
government consumption expenditure. Fourth, the measure of structural change employed 
here (AGEMR) has a negative estimated coefficient.  This means that as the agricultural 
sector of the Fijian economy becomes less important, there is an increased demand for 
existing services, and/or a demand for new services, provided by government. 
 
The Lagrange multiplier test for residual serial correlation up to orders 1  and 2 for the 
equation reported in column (B) clearly indicates that the estimated equation is still subject to 
the problem of autocorrelation. In this context this diagnostic test lends support to the view 
that this equation is subject to misspecification. 
 
Column (C) of Table 3 reports the econometric results for the institutional/political model 
(M2).  It should be noted that the specification of this equation is different from that of 
Equation (3), as the insignificant explanatory variables have been e xcluded (with one 
exception) from Equation (3) by adopting the general to specific methodology. As mentioned 
earlier, insignificant variables were omitted by applying several maximum likelihood tests 
involving joint restrictions on explanatory variables in order to obtain the most parsimonious 
and robust estimates. Also we have undertaken exhaustive diagnostic tests. 
 
The exception mentioned above is the lagged variable on government expenditure. This 
variable was highly significant, but when entered in the equation, all other coefficients 
became insignificant. This lagged dependent variable is dominant. This issue will be 
addressed below.   
 
With an adjusted R
2 of 0.859, the equation reported in column (C) performs very well in 
terms of goodness-of-fit and passes the overall F test at the one per cent level. Furthermore, 
this equation passes all diagnostic tests (with the exception of the Ramsey RESET test) and 
the stochastic residuals are white noise. 
 
As seen from Table 3, the estimated equation for the institutional/political model (M2) is 
rather simple.  The variable (SEREMR), measuring interest group influence, is significant, 
but the offset variable (OPEN) is also significant with an unexpected sign. Based on the 
above procedure, the taxation variables concerning fiscal illusion, HHIT and DTAXR and all 
remaining institutional variables were not significant and consequently are not reported in   14 
Table 3. Given that all equations reported in columns (A), (B), and (C) of Table 3 have not 
passed all diagnostic tests, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients should be taken 
with a pinch of salt. 
 
This discussion of Table 3 has been confined to the econometric results reported in columns 
(A), (B) and (C). As yet no comment has been made on the results in column (D). The 
discussion of  these results will be undertaken later in this section of the paper.     
 
Attention is now directed to applying non-nested tests to these two models.  Table 4 presents 
the results of four different non-nested test statistics. The four tests employed are as follows: 
the Cox test, the Ericsson Instrumental Variable (IV) test, the Sargan restricted/unrestricted 
reduced form test, and the encompassing (F) test, which is also referred to as the joint model 
test. For details see Hendry and Doornik [1999]. 
 
The structure of Table 4 manifests the procedure of undertaking non-nested tests, i.e. the null 
hypothesis (H0) is arbitrarily determined, and the alternative hypothesis (H1) is also arbitrary.  
Such arbitrariness is acknowledged by the reversal of the null and alternative hypotheses.  
This reversal explains why the economic/apolitical model (M1) and the institutional/political 
model (M2) appear in both the columns and the rows of Table 4. 
 
The results of row (1) of this Table, in w hich M2 is the null, indicate rejection of the 
institutional/political model by the four tests.  The results from the four non-nested tests as 
indicated in row (2) of Table 4, in which M1 is regarded as the null, also suggest rejection of 
the economic/apolitical model. In other words, we have a case of double rejection. More 
importantly the statistical inference drawn here is not subject to reversal by using different 
non-nested test statistics. 
 
What do these results mean?  Essentially these results signify that an explanation of 
government expenditure in Fiji can not be found in either a solely institutional/political model 
or a pure economic/apolitical model. However, it cannot be concluded that 
economic/apolitical or institutional/political variables are irrelevant. To analyse this issue, 
attention is now directed to the specification and estimation of a comprehensive model 
including all the variables in both models. As before we have applied general to specific 
econometric methodology to estimate this equation. The parsimonious equation thus obtained 
is indicated in column (D) of Table 3.   
 
Compared with the other estimated equations, this equation performs better in terms of 
goodness-of-fit statistics as well as diagnostic tests: the adjusted R
2 is 0.965 and the equation 
clearly passes the overall F test. Note that, unlike the other equations reported in columns 
(A), (B), and (C), the comprehensive model passes each and every diagnostic tests without 
any exception, and, as a result, this is our preferred equation. The highly significant estimated 
coefficient of the relative price variable, which measures both the own-price elasticity of 
demand and the cross-price elasticity of demand, indicates that the demand for government 
goods and services is inelastic with a magnitude of –0.90. The income coefficient had the 
expected positive sign but was not statistically different from zero and thus it has not 
appeared in our preferred comprehensive model.  This comprehensive model includes the 
measure of structural change (AGEMR) with the expected (and significant) negative 
coefficient of –0.49. This means that as the agricultural sector of the Fijian economy declines   15 
in relative importance,  there is an increased demand for existing services, and/or a demand 
for new services, provided by government. 
 
It is noteworthy that all the explanatory variables in the institutional/political model in 
column (C) of Table 3 are also significant and included in the comprehensive model. In other 
words, the estimated institutional/political model (column C) is nested in our preferred 
equation (column D). Borcherding’s [1985] inability to specify the numerical importance of 
the institutional variables did not indicate that such variables were irrelevant:  this 
econometric analysis shows conclusively that “institutions matter” in terms of explaining the 
growth of recurrent government expenditure in Fiji. It is also important to observe that the 
1987-88 military coups, as measured by DUM(Coup), have exerted a highly significant 
adverse impact on government expenditure in Fiji.  
 
As pointed out earlier, the lagged dependent variable, when included, was a dominant 
variable in the institutional/political model, and made all the other variables insignificant. 
This has not occurred in the comprehensive model. Also the economic/apolitical model was 
plagued with serial correlation. Even the use of AR(1) could not fix the problem. It is 
interesting that in our comprehensive model neither AR(1) was required nor the lagged 
dependent variable was f ound to be significant. Furthermore, according to a battery of 
diagnostic tests reported in Table 3, our final equation does not show any sign of 
misspecification.  
 
We have already compared the economic/apolitical model with the institutional/political  
model using four non-nested tests. As discussed earlier these four tests consistently indicated 
that neither model is adequate in explaining government expenditure. As seen from Table 3, 
the estimated institutional/political model is nested within the comprehensive model. Thus it 
is inappropriate to continue to consider applying non-nested tests in this pairwise comparison. 
However, how can we make sure that the comprehensive model is superior to the 
economic/apolitical model? Non-nested tests can answer this question.  The results are 
presented in Table 5.  
 
The results in row 1 of Table 5 reveal that the comprehensive model (M3) is preferred to the 
economic/apolitical model (M1). This conclusion holds for all four test statistics. Row 2 
indicates when M1 is regarded as the null hypothesis against M3 the conclusion is 
unambiguous: according to the four test statistics  M1 is rejected against M3. Therefore, it can 
be safely concluded that the comprehensive model is necessary to explain government current 





ALTERNATIVE TESTS OF  NON-NESTED (ECONOMIC/APOLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL) MODELS OF 
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Note:  * indicates that the relevant null hypotheses are rejected at 5 percent level of significance. 18 
VIII.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The existing literature of the demand for government goods and services is dominated by 
studies of western countries and services provided by state or local governments.  This study 
is “a little bit different” in that it is one of the first such studies of a low middle income 
country with a government sector comprising services generally provided by central and state 
governments.  With respect to the first point it should not be automatically concluded that 
economic analysis of this kind is not applicable to a country such as Fiji:  it should be recalled 
that Pryor [1968] succeeded in analysing government behaviour of countries with markedly 
different systems, and that Wagner and Weber [1975] successfully analysed governments 
with different organisational and behavioural (competition or monopoly) characteristics. 
 
The central focus of this paper is to provide an answer to the question posed by Borcherding 
[1985] concerning the relative importance of economic/apolitical and institutional/political 
factors in determining government expenditure in Fiji.  The unique feature of this analysis is 
to apply non-nested tests to shed some light on the issue.  It is found, using a number of 
different non-nested tests, that variables from both the institutional/political model and the 
economic/apolitical model of the determinants of the demand for government services are 
necessary. Thus, this study provides, not only  further evidence that “institutions matter”,  but 
that the conventional economic variables are also necessary to explain current government 
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